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AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY: OLD PRINCIPLES
FOR AN (ALLEGEDLY) BRAVE NEW WORLD
HARRY F. TEPKER*
In times of turmoil, fear, and uncertainty, it is tempting to believe that
our nation is suffering in an unprecedented way, even though history gives
us many precedents and antecedents to underscore the old joke: “If history
doesn’t repeat itself, it sure does rhyme.”1 Today’s Americans view our
current plight—“this post-truth, alternative facts moment—as some
inexplicable and crazy new American phenomenon. In fact, what’s
happening is just the ultimate extrapolation and expression of attitudes and
instincts that have made America exceptional for its entire history—and
really from its prehistory.”2 Still, the nation is undergoing what might be
described as a stress test: suspicions and investigations; a pattern of
governmental lying; a pattern of political lying to gain power; overt and
covert cultivation of haters, bigots, and the fearful; political polarization; a
rising fear of authoritarian and autocratic patterns.3
* Professor of Law & Floyd and Irma Calvert Chair of Law and Liberty, the
University of Oklahoma College of Law. This Essay is based on remarks on the First
Amendment and Falsehood delivered at the 2018 Oklahoma Law Review Symposium on
February 9, 2018.
1. The oft-used joke is attributed to Mark Twain, but like many quotations, it lacks
verification. Brian Adams, History Doesn’t Repeat, but It Often Rhymes, HUFFPOST (Jan. 19,
2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/brian-adams/history-doesnt-repeat-but-it-oftenrhymes_a_21657884/.
2. KURT ANDERSEN, FANTASYLAND: HOW AMERICA WENT HAYWIRE 11 (2017).
3. Inevitably, finger-pointing dominates and taints any too brief summary of our
nation’s “stress test,” but we should not overlook the responsibility of the media, empowered
by new and powerful technology. As summarized by commentator Franklin Foer:
Donald Trump is the culmination of the era. He understood how, more than at
any moment in recent history, media need to give the public what it wants, a
circus that exploits subconscious tendencies and biases. Even if media
disdained Trump’s outrages, they built him up as a character and a plausible
candidate. For years, media pumped Trump’s theories about President Obama’s
foreign birth into circulation, even though they were built on dunes of crap. It
gave endless attention to his initial smears of immigrants, even though media
surely understood how those provocations stoked an atmosphere of paranoia
and hate. Once Trump became a plausible candidate, media had no choice but
to cover him. But media had carried him to that point. Stories about Trump
yielded the sort of traffic that pleased the Gods of Data and benefited the
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The assigned mission for this Essay was historical background. But this
Essay also offers a brief plea for an old faith in the face of new fears; or
more precisely, a faith in old, settled principles that we dare not discard
because we are passing through times of ideological and partisan conflict. It
is far, far better if we laugh. “It is by the goodness of God that in our
country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of
speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of
them.”4 So wrote Mark Twain.
There have been many times in American history when citizens took
solace in humor. Famously, the defeated presidential candidate Adlai
Stevenson quoted a joke attributed to Abraham Lincoln: “I’m like the boy
who stubbed his toe in the dark. I’m too old to cry and it hurts too much to
laugh.”5 We must hope that most election defeats are like stubbed toes (no
matter what we really think), but we should remember Oklahoma’s own
Will Rogers: “On account of being a democracy and run by the people, we
are the only nation in the world that has to keep a government four years,
no matter what it does.”6
These days it is hard to avoid laughing, painfully, even when consulting
old wisdom. James Madison hoped, “Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance.”7 Reasonable citizens today might well doubt Mr. Madison’s
powers of prophecy. And yet, who can deny Madison’s thinking? “[A]
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power knowledge gives.”8 “A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a

bottom line. Trump began as Cecil the Lion, and then ended up president of the
United States.
FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 149
(2017).
4. MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 195 (New York, Doubleday & McClure
1897), https://archive.org/details/followingequator00twaiuoft.
5. Jena McGregor, Remembering a Speech from ‘The Most Beautiful Loser’ After
Trump Won’t Commit to Accepting Results, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/10/20/remembering-a-speech-from-themost-beautiful-loser-after-trump-wont-commit-to-acceptingresults/?utm_term=.883217d2b447.
6. Quotes, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF WILL ROGERS, https://www.cmgww.com/historic/
rogers/about/photos/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
7. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in Epilogue: Securing the
Republic, FOUNDERS’ CONST., http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18
s35.html (last visited May 23, 2018).
8. Id.
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Tragedy, or, perhaps both.”9 The wit and wisdom are part of the traditions
of our republic that require remembrance and defense, even when we lack
confidence.
Origins and Evolution: Beyond Blackstone to Madison’s Report
History is essential preface. Constitutional debate usually begins with
some sort of discussion that asks the question: What did the framers think
about freedom of expression? When resisting a bill of rights on the theory
that it would do little good, Alexander Hamilton asked a question that
courts were forced to answer, though it took a century and a half to begin
the interpretive process. “What signifies a declaration, that ‘the liberty of
the press shall be inviolably preserved’? What is the liberty of the press?
Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude
for evasion?”10
If you were a lawyer in 1776 or 1788 or 1798, there was not much
doctrine to respond to Mr. Hamilton’s rhetorical question. A lawyer did not
have much law to read, except Blackstone in his commentaries on the law
of England. And there he gave what is probably the central beginning point
of American doctrine defining free speech:11 there shall be no censorship or
prior restraint; but there is no protection or immunity for dangerous or
disruptive expression.12 So, we must understand that our liberty today is
much broader, greater and more comprehensive than it was at the creation
of our new republic. While the framers thought clearly and extensively
about religious liberty,13 they didn’t do much thinking about freedom of
expression.14
9. Id.
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
11. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150–53.
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid
this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.
Id.
12. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY at ix (1960) (“I have been reluctantly forced to conclude that the
generation which adopted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not believe in a broad
scope for freedom of expression, particularly in the realm of politics.”).
13. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (June 20, 1785), in Amendment I (Religion), FOUNDERS' CONST., http://press-
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The best evidence of this was the enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798,
signed into law by John Adams.15 The law declared that, if you criticize the
government or the President or the Congress in a way that will bring them
into public contempt, you will go to jail.16 If the law of the past applied
today, you can imagine the number of people who could be going to jail:
the entire cast of Saturday Night Live; Stephen Colbert; the staffs of CNN
and MSNBC; and the author of this Essay, yours truly. Only the names
would change if we took the measure of the President’s critics in 2013; one
vulnerable celebrity who would suffer from enhanced punishment for
alleged or proved lies damaging to the reputation of the incumbent
President would have been the “birther-in-chief” himself.17
When measuring the course of our nation’s history, we should be
chastened to remember that Federalist federal courts upheld the Sedition
Act of 1798: it was not prior restraint, and it embodied all of the elements
of a modern liberal law, at least for the 1790s.18 The only progress was
theoretical. Madison published a new libertarian theory of free speech, but
at first it was only political propaganda to denounce the Adams
administration.19 Still, Madison claimed the First Amendment goes beyond
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html (last visited May 18,
2018).
14. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS xii (1985) [hereinafter LEVY,
EMERGENCE] (“[T]he theory of freedom of political expression remained quite narrow until
1798. . . . The revolutionary generation did not seek to wipe out the core idea of seditious
libel, that government may be criminally assaulted by mere words . . . .”).
15. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 417, 424 (“Donald Trump is a pure
fantasyland being, its apotheosis . . . . Trump launched his political career by embracing a
brand-new conspiracy theory twisted around to other deep American taproots—fear and
loathing of foreigners and nonwhites. In 2011 Trump became chief spokesperson for the
fantasy that President Barack Obama was born in Kenya, a fringe idea that he brought into
the mainstream.”); KATY TUR, UNBELIEVABLE 222–24 (2017) (“You remember that, right?
Trump’s one-man crusade to prove, without evidence, that the first African American
president was illegitimate because he was born in Kenya . . . . [I]t’s not as though Trump had
apologized for the birtherism . . . . But instead of apologizing, he kept lying.”).
18. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 14, at 202–03 (stating that the sponsors and authors
of the statute “acted in full consistency with [their] opinions expressed . . . [that] falsehoods
and scandals against the government should be punished ‘with becoming rigour.’ . . . Why,
asked [Justice] Cushing, need an honest man ‘be afraid of truth? The guilty only fear it.’”).
19. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in Amendment I
(Speech and Press), FOUNDERS' CONST., http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/amendI_speechs24.html (last visited May 18, 2018) [hereinafter Report on the
Virginia Resolutions].
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Blackstone’s prior restraint principle: “It would seem a mockery to say that
no laws should be passed preventing publications from being made, but that
laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should be made.”20
He claimed that free speech must exist for the sake of progress of the nation
and western civilization: “[C]an the wisdom of this policy be doubted by
any who reflect that to the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses, the
world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason
and humanity over error and oppression . . . .”21 Though law and doctrine
might not have evolved, the nation owed a great debt to the actualities of a
functioning free press: “Had ‘Sedition Acts’ . . . been uniformly enforced
against the press, might not the United States have been languishing at this
day under the infirmities of a sickly Confederation? Might they not,
possibly, be miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke?”22
Madison also argued that “truth as a defense,” explicitly embodied in the
Sedition Act, was not enough to guarantee the benefits of free expression:
“[O]pinions . . . may often be more the objects of the prosecution than the
facts themselves . . . .”23 Madison’s Report also began a long tradition of
defending free expression for the sake of democracy. After all, the people’s
right to choose their leaders “depends on the knowledge of the comparative
merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal
freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and
demerits of the candidates respectively.”24 Reflecting the democratic
traditions of the republic, Madison posited that free speech is essential to
the sovereignty of “we, the people.” Madison’s argument reflects a modern
sensibility:
What will be the situation of the people? Not free; because they
will be compelled to make their election between competitors
whose pretensions they are not permitted by the act equally to
examine, to discuss, and to ascertain. And from both these
situations will not those in power derive an undue advantage for
continuing themselves in it, which, by impairing the right of
election, endangers the blessings of the Government founded on
it?25

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Inspired by the pleas of Madison, expressive liberty developed, but
slowly. Law outgrew original meanings, but it took decades. After the
Sedition Act and well into the twentieth century, state government had
primary responsibility for defining freedom of expression. And in the few
cases falling within federal jurisdiction, doctrine hardly did anything for the
cause of liberty.
One example of the prevailing doctrine in the World War I era is
chilling. A Vermont minister mimeographed (the media of the day) a
statement that Christ prohibited his disciples from fighting for him on the
eve of his crucifixion; this meant that no good Christian could draw a sword
on behalf of the city where he dwells.26 The minister gave that to a number
of other ministers—a couple of old men and one young man of military age.
He was prosecuted by the federal government for a violation of the
Espionage Act of 1917.27 He was sentenced to jail for fifteen years for this
one piece of mimeographed paper, and he served one year.28
This case is illustrative of doctrine in place in America during World
War I,29 and it is the type of case that inspired new academic and judicial
theories of free expression, including the famous dissents of Oliver Wendell
Holmes and, later, Louis Brandeis.30

26. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 55–56 (1941)
(discussing the case of Rev. Clarence H. Waldron).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 50–51.
30. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring)
(“Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant
men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the
processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 44 (1969); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that
they should be given their chance and have their way.”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Democracy: Leaving the Truth of Political Opinion to “We, the People”
After the Sedition Act and well into the twentieth century, there was not
much protection for free speech. Until the modern era (and well after 1937,
the usual date for the modern era) hardly a word was heard from the courts
to protect a broader freedom of speech.31 Most judges still deferred to
democratic process and outcome.32 Felix Frankfurter spoke most clearly for
judicial self-restraint even in cases presenting First Amendment claims: he
argued free speech was not an exception to the principle of majority rule.33
The evolution of federal constitutional law seemed to take a long time,
primarily because the Court did not endorse anything remotely resembling a
libertarian theory of free speech until the Warren Court. Only in the
aftermath of the McCarthyism trauma, during the civil rights era and the
1960s did courts act on a sense that they had a judicial duty to remedy
executive, legislative, and prosecutorial abuse.34 The courts struggled—but
ultimately succeeded—in developing manageable, enforceable principles to
protect expressive liberty. The courts settled on a consensus approach that
defined a categorical hostility to government discrimination against
ideologies, philosophies, and viewpoints.35 That consensus approach is the
foundation of the law today.
31. See generally Alan Brinkley, The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of
1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1046 (2005) (discussing the modern era).
32. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
33. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court)
(“[I]t would be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy,
provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not forbidden by some explicit limitation.”);
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 539 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Free-speech cases are not an
exception to the principle that we are not legislators, that direct policy-making is not our
province.”).
34. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing judicial
duty).
35. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980).
If . . . history . . . teaches us anything, it is that attempts to evaluate the threat
posed by the communication of an alien view inevitably become involved with
the ideological predispositions of those doing the evaluating, and certainly with
the relative confidence or paranoia of the age. If the First Amendment is even
to begin to serve its central function of assuring an open political dialogue and
process, we must seek to minimize assessment of the dangerousness of the
various messages people want to communicate. [When] state officials seek to
silence a message because they think it’s dangerous, . . . we insist that the
message fall within some clearly and narrowly bounded category of expression
we have designated in advance as unentitled to protection.
Id.
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The principal case addressing falsehood and the First Amendment—and
in so doing, defining the central meaning of the First Amendment—is New
York Times v. Sullivan.36 The facts are simple and basically undisputed.
Police Commissioner Sullivan sued the authors of a newspaper
advertisement in the Times and the Times itself for libel.37 Sullivan was
concerned about an advertisement in defense of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.38 It described the heroic efforts of Dr. King and condemned the southern
strategies of repression.39 The problem was that the advertisement was
inaccurate in several particulars: they got some dates wrong and they got
some details about the location of events wrong.40 There was no specific
reference to Police Commissioner Sullivan, but the ad contained criticism
of the agency he led.41
What was going on? Needless to say, the lawsuit reflected no desire to
vindicate truth or fact. If Sullivan prevailed, the lawsuit would certainly
silence the civil rights movement in Alabama as well as the newspaper that
covered the issue; as two commentators put it, “Silence, not money, was the
goal.”42 If the defamation judgment of the Alabama courts in Sullivan had
been upheld—combined with other defamation actions confronting the
Times at the time—there was reasonable fear that the greatest paper in
America could not survive.43
The question before the United States Supreme Court was whether this
law, as applied to public criticism of public officials in the performance of
their public duties, violated the First Amendment.44 In a magnificent

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

376 U.S. at 254.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 231 (2006).
If the [Alabama] officials could win, they would almost certainly silence the
civil rights movement in Alabama – as well as the newspaper that consistently
covered it. Silence, not money, was the goal. Alabama had some experience in
forcing its opposition off the playing field. The NAACP in Alabama had been
barred from doing business and been wiped out five years earlier; two more
years before the ban could be lifted.
Id.
43. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
35, 146 (1991).
44. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
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opinion by Justice William Brennan, the Supreme Court struck down the
judgment and the award:
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.45
Brennan’s opinion in Sullivan is celebrated, glorified, and controversial.
Justice Antonin Scalia proclaimed that the case was wrongly decided
because it was inconsistent with the framers’ understanding.46 And in a real
sense, he was probably right: the holding was quite far removed from
original understanding. But so are the campaign finance cases;47 the hate
speech cases;48 and the flag desecration cases.49 Indeed, almost all First
Amendment doctrine is far removed from original understandings, and
Justice Scalia supported the bulk of it.50 It may not be enough to be
“originalism,” strictly speaking, but Justice Brennan’s rationale tracked the
view of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment and the Bill of
Rights—at least, the view of the “father of the Constitution” eleven years
after the Philadelphia convention and seven years after ratification of the
First Amendment. If Brennan did not draw from thinking prior to
45. Id. at 270.
46. See JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 377–78 n.37 (2009) (“I’m critical of [Sullivan] because if
there’s anything that is counter to originalism, it’s that. The Court made up a new libel
law.”); John W. Dean, Justice Scalia’s Thoughts, and a Few of My Own, on New York Times
v. Sullivan, FINDLAW (Dec. 2, 2005), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/justicescalias-thoughts-and-a-few-of-my-own-on-new-york-times-v-sullivan.html (“Scalia revealed
that he felt the landmark 1964 ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan was wrong. . . . ‘I don't
think that's what the founding fathers intended,’ Scalia said . . . .”).
47. See, e.g., BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 405 (2014) (discussing
Citizens United and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Professor Murphy notes that
Scalia “could not call upon the wisdom of the Founders” in support of his “more speech is
better” view).
48. Id. at 195 (discussing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), Professor
Murphy notes Scalia’s “willingness to protect all speech, even that which he did not like”).
49. Id. But see, e.g., id. at 228 (noting a case, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,
in which Justice Scalia turned away from his pattern of being “a self-proclaimed champion
of nearly unlimited free speech,” to argue against a right to engage in anonymous
electioneering because after searching through original historical materials, “[e]vidence that
anonymous electioneering was regarded as a constitutional right is sparse”).
50. Id.
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ratification of the First Amendment, as Scalia notes, he did rely heavily on
political arguments of the Jeffersonian opponents of the Sedition Act, best
articulated by James Madison in his famous “Virginia Report” of 1800.51
In his opinion, Justice Brennan made a number of important, specific
Madisonian observations. First, punishing falsehood alone is not enough
justification to silence or deter public debate: “[E]rroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to
survive.’”52 Doctrine had turned away from “any test of truth—whether
administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials—and especially
one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker.”53 Protection did
not and should not depend “upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of
the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’”54 Punishment of falsehood, even
in defense of someone’s reputation, was not enough justification for
suppressing public debate.55 And even more boldly (because no court had
gone to this point before), proof of falsehood plus proof of damaged
reputation plus proof of negligence (for instance, failure to verify all the
facts in the advertisement) was not sufficient to hold the New York Times
responsible.56
The Court also embraced the Madisonian view, identified by some
scholars as the central meaning of the First Amendment: free speech exists
for the sake of democracy. The people’s power to govern depends upon
their ability to judge the merits and demerits of candidates, and if
incumbents can rig the game by preventing criticism of incumbents, the
people’s ability to govern by free choice is threatened.57 Madison had
51. See Report on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 19.
52. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (2004)).
53. Id. at 271 (comparing with Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958)).
54. Id. (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 445).
55. Id. at 273.
56. Id.
57. Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 735
(1963).
If the Constitution is viewed as adopting representative government as a device
by which the people are to govern themselves, a significant function of the
freedom of speech clause is at once apparent. The device calls for reciprocal
government; for the people to govern the delegated authority by which they are
governed. This cannot work unless there is an independent popular consensus,
protected from governmental intervention, to which the delegated authority can
be held responsible. If the delegated authority is permitted to prescribe what
may and may not be advocated, especially in the realm of political theory and

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/3

2018]

OLD PRINCIPLES FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD

27

emphasized the link between free expression and representative
government:
[T]he right of electing the members of the Government [is] the
essence of a free and responsible government. The value and
efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the
comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public
trust, and on the equal freedom, of consequently, examining and
discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates
respectively.”58
The Court’s opinion made the same point:
Earlier, in a debate in the House of Representatives, Madison
had said: “If we advert to the nature of Republican Government,
we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the
Government, and not in the Government over the people.” . . .
The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public
officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of
the American form of government.59
America cherishes free speech primarily as a way to preserve democratic
influence over republican institutions.
An Illustrative Story: Pursuing “Lies” After Campaigns
Every case is also a story. One little-known, little-noted case, Chavez v.
Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law,60 illustrates the need to leave
controversies about the truth or falsity of opinion to the judgment of the
voters. In 1978, California courts considered a lawsuit brought by the
heroic, legendary leader of California farm workers who had campaigned
for “Proposition 14,” a statewide initiative on the ballot in November

policy, then, pro tanto, it is no longer responsible to a popular will independent
of its own, but to a reflection of its own will. The people can still select, at the
ballot box, those by whom they are to be governed, but they can no longer
govern through them. The government may still be representative in form, but
self-government is not its substance.
Id.; see also, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948).
58. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275 n.15.
59. Id. at 275.
60. 148 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Ct. App. 1978).
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1976.61 Proposition 14 would have allowed union organizers to access
private property to speak to farm workers. Farm owners opposed the
measure.62 Their political argument used ordinary rhetoric of a political
character: Proposition 14 was an attack on the “rights” of farm owners. 63
Chavez and allies cried “foul” and “smear.”64 The people rejected the
initiative by a large margin. Chavez and allies went to court to relitigate and
vindicate their defeated argument.
Chavez and his allies pointed out—accurately—that a labor law creating
access rights for union organizers did not violate constitutional rights.65
After the new jurisprudence of the “New Deal” era, property could be the
subject of reasonable regulation for a variety of reasons. For their part, the
farm owners pointed out—also accurately—that without some sort of
legally mandated access, a property owner has the “right” to bar unwelcome
persons from private property.66 A law that creates such access diminishes
the otherwise rightful power of the owner over their own property.67
The argument was a clash between competing accuracies, competing
oversimplifications, and competing claims of lies. It was a classic issue
about which reasonable minds have differed throughout the history of our
republic. Debating our “rights” is the real national pastime. Arguments
fashioned in the rhetoric of rights as arguments for rights dominated the
push for national independence, for and against slavery, for and against
civil rights laws in the nineteenth century and again in the mid-twentieth
century. The problem is that voters and citizens do not always think like
lawyers and they do not speak of their “rights” in precise legal terms.
Another problem is that the legal definition of “rights” changes, sometimes
quite dramatically.
The Chavez plaintiffs took the unusual position that the farm owners
“lied,” because argument against the initiative did not reflect current federal
constitutional law or current state law.68 They sought money damages to
compensate for campaign costs suffered because of the “lies.”69 There were
several elementary problems with the doomed theory of the Chavez
61. Id. at 279.
62. Full disclosure requires that the author of this Essay state that he was a junior
member of the legal team representing the farm owners.
63. Chavez, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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plaintiffs. The farm owners’ campaign arguments against the Proposition
were statements of opinion, not fact. The arguments focused genuine issues
of legitimate public concern. And all arguments for and against Proposition
14 were political expression. Pure politics. Ordinary politics. For better or
worse, it was the ordinary stuff of democracy.
In this long-forgotten case, many of the ideas polarizing debate today can
be observed. There was passion and many accusations of lying and
alternative facts. There was anger and concern about the imbalance in
campaign spending: the rich versus the poor. There was an unspoken but
obvious lack of confidence in the ability of the voters to sort out truth
versus falsehood. The Chavez plaintiffs were trying to prove that they did
not deserve to lose the political debate. And if they succeeded, it might
have been a first chapter in a new regime of government and judicial
regulation of political argument measured against a standard of “truth” and
“fact.” The law might have become a source of endless struggle embodied
in intrusive, restrictive election codes. Virtually every campaign in
California and throughout the nation would entail expensive re-litigation.
The California trial court dismissed the claims of the Chavez plaintiffs in
an appropriately summary fashion.70 The California Court of Appeal
rejected the arguments of the Chavez plaintiffs.71 The judges offered a brief
opinion with a straightforward explanation. Chavez was not a landmark
case, because so few losing candidates and losing causes seek remedies in
the courts. The judges knew this: “There [were] only a few published cases
where a plaintiff seeks damages for fraudulent misrepresentation in a
political campaign.”72 But the opinion is consistent with oft-quoted
elements of celebrated Supreme Court pronouncements. First, as the judges
agreed, “[t]he basic issue in this case is whether we are dealing with a
statement of fact or an opinion.” 73 The distinction was decisive, because
“courts apply the Constitution by carefully distinguishing between
statements of opinion and fact, treating the one as constitutionally protected
and imposing on the other civil liability for its abuse.”74 Second, the
appropriate treatment of the case was guided by the overriding goal “to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.”75 Third, “[t]he Constitution, and
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 279.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1987)).
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public policy, require open public debate on initiative issues without the
‘chilling’ effect of legal reprisals.”76
Our courts do not entertain litigation over truth or falsehood in election
campaigns. The strikingly small number of attempts is a symptom of a core
idea—influenced most by the rationale in New York Times v. Sullivan:
government agencies, including courts, are not permitted to measure the
arguments of any advocate in the electoral arena against some idealized—
and no doubt flawed—standard of truth and accuracy.
The First Amendment and the Sovereignty of the People
If the nation is suffering a stress test, it should surprise no one that First
Amendment doctrine is also challenged and tested. In the dissenting
opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, eloquent and inspiring words
articulate reasons why freedom of expression is important, fundamental,
and deserving of special protection.77 One of the most famous arguments
points toward a kind of intellectual Darwinism in which facts and the
strongest ideas survive.78 Belief in the unregulated marketplace of ideas, as
influentially described by Justice Holmes, is still widely quoted, though
perhaps not so widely believed:79
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . . But when
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out.80

76. Id.
77. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 630.
79. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 5 (“The American experiment, the original
embodiment of the great Enlightenment idea of intellectual freedom, every individual free to
believe anything she wishes, has metastasized out of control. . . . In America those more
exciting parts of the Enlightenment idea have swamped the sober, rational, empirical
parts.”).
80. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The “old faith” underlying our commitment to expressive liberty rests on
the judgment that some basics are “common ground.” For example,
“[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not
on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas.”81 Our nation will do no better if it tries—through legislation and
judicial decree—to hold political rhetoric to standards of “fairness,” or
“accuracy,” or government-prescribed “truth.” We will have no more
wisdom—and considerably less freedom—if government agencies,
including courts, begin to measure political arguments in the electoral arena
against some idealized, and no doubt flawed, standard of truth and
accuracy.
It may seem odd or strange now, but for many years, the legal profession
confronted cases resting on case-by-case assessments of gain and pain, cost
and benefit, advantages of liberty versus threats to order. “Ad hoc
balancing” seemed inevitable and dominant, and so lawyers wrestled with
doubts about whether the First Amendment was really law, or merely a
label attached to a process that lacked any real rules.82 Today, such doubt
sounds strange because a categorical approach emerged. Learned Hand had
criticized the Holmes clear and present danger test, because he preferred “a
qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade. If it could
become sacred by the incrustations of time and precedent, it might be made
to serve just a little to withhold the torrents of passion.”83 Hand did not live
to see the full impact of his observation,84 but the collective work of the
federal judiciary sought a more coherent and more conceptual First
Amendment, because “balancing” seemed to be a subjective, unpredictable
process. The controversy once divided Justice Frankfurter from Justice
Black.85 More recently, ideologies have shuffled: a categorical approach
was championed by Justice Brennan and Scalia, while flexibility was
81. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
82. Compare Frantz, supra note 57, with Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the
First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); see also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, MORALITY OF CONSENT 57 (1975) (“The rights which the First
Amendment creates cannot be established by any theoretical definition, as Burke said of the
rights of man, but are in ‘balance between differences of good, in compromises sometimes
between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil.’ . . . The First Amendment is
no coherent theory that points our way to unambiguous decisions . . . .”).
83. Learned Hand, REASON AND IMAGINATION – THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF
LEARNED HAND 103 (Constance Jordan ed. 2013).
84. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND JUDGE 169, 603 (1994).
85. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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thought to be a virtue, at least in the view of Justice Stevens86 and Chief
Justice Rehnquist.87 If there is common ground in that overextended and
overemphasized debate, it is in the consensus surrounding New York Times
v. Sullivan.
It may be also be found in the careful workmanship of Justice John
Marshall Harlan II in Cohen v. California.88 The facts of the case seem
trivial. An angry draft protester wore a jacket with a prominent, profane
epithet in the Los Angeles County Courthouse; as a result, he was arrested
and convicted for disturbing the peace.89 The Harlan opinion is a useful
toolkit for a variety of First Amendment problems, but it also spoke to first
principles and an old faith. In his view, the states lack a general power to
“maintain . . . a suitable level of discourse within the body politic.”90
Endorsing the emerging categorical approach, the Harlan analysis held that
states have legitimate reasons to act only when expression falls within the
“various established exceptions” to the “usual rule that government bodies
may not prescribe the form or content of individual expression.”91 The
principles serve a central purpose. They “remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion” so that ideas and information will flow
freely “in the hope that the use of such freedom will ultimately produce a
more capable citizenry.”92 From Madison to Brennan to Harlan comes the
idea that doctrine must serve democracy.
At least, that is, when a case involves political speech on matters of
public interest, including elections, government regulation is restricted. As
the Court wrote in Mills v. Alabama:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
86. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), Justice Stevens wrote one of his
opinions designed to question the categorical approach, because it “sacrifices subtlety for
clarity and is, I am convinced, ultimately unsound. As an initial matter, the concept of
‘categories’ fits poorly with the complex reality of expression. Few dividing lines in First
Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably give
rise only to fuzzy boundaries.” Id. at 426.
87. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
88. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
89. Id. at 16–17.
90. Id. at 23.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id.
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discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government,
the manner in which government is operated or should be
operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.93
The viewpoints, philosophies, and substantive ideas of those who
participate in the political process are not subject to the scrutiny or
punishment of any governmental agency based on notions of fact or truth. If
plaintiffs genuinely seek to reduce the amount of falsehood in campaign
rhetoric, their only recourse is to rebuttal, to enter the marketplace of ideas,
to appeal to the good judgment of voters whose will is supposed to be
sovereign.
The concept of fraud is not easily translated from the context of
commercial advertising to political argument. In Virginia Pharmacy Board
v. Virginia Consumer Council,94 Justice Potter Stewart offered a concurring
opinion that explained “the important differences” between commercial
speech and ideological communication:
The Court’s determination that commercial advertising of the
kind at issue here is not ‘wholly outside the protection of the
First Amendment indicates by its very phrasing that there are
important differences between commercial price and product
advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication on
the other. Ideological expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial, or
theatrical, is integrally related to the exposition of thought—
thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of
man. Although such expression may convey factual information
relevant to social and individual decisionmaking, it is protected
by the Constitution, whether or not it contains factual
representations and even if it includes inaccurate assertions of
fact. Indeed, disregard of the ‘truth’ may be employed to give
force to the underlying idea expressed by the speaker. . . .
Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly
from ideological expression because it is confined to the
promotion of specific goods or services. The First Amendment
protects the advertisement because of the “information of
potential interest and value” conveyed, rather than because of
any direct contribution to the interchange of ideas. Since the
factual claims contained in commercial price or product
93. 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966).
94. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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advertisements relate to tangible goods or services, they may be
tested empirically and corrected to reflect the truth without in
any manner jeopardizing the free dissemination of thought.
Indeed, the elimination of false and deceptive claims serves to
promote the one facet of commercial price and product
advertising that warrants First Amendment protection—its
contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable information
relevant to public and private decisionmaking.95
Our past is messy—filled with conspiracy theories, nightmare fantasies,
whitewashing myths, historical amnesia and misunderstandings, bigotry,
ignorance, and partisan lies. Our law—in the past half-century at least—is
dedicated to the idea that the messiness is a symptom of freedom, and that
freedom serves self-government. Worries may be reasonable and
understandable,96 but Justice Harlan spoke for the dominant view of the
legal profession, which sees the First Amendment as an expression of
confidence. “That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony
is . . . not a sign of weakness but of strength.”97

95. Id. at 779–81 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes and internal citations omitted).
96. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985).
[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first amendment
to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and
most likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other
words, should be targeted for the worst of times.
Id.
97. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
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